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also,-not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality
or of a quantity. For it must be either by an equivocation that we
say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of 'are'
(in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),-the
truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same
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METAPHYSICS 79
sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a reference
to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor
yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument
are called medical neither by an ambiguity nor with a single meaning,
but with reference to a common end. But it does not matter at all
in which of the two ways one likes to describe the facts; this is
evident, that definition and essence in the primary and simple sense
belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well, only
not in the primary sense. For if we suppose this it does not follow
that there is a definition of every word which means the same as any
formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula; and
this condition is satisfied if it is a formula of something which
is one, not by continuity like the Iliad or the things that are one
by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of 'one', which
answer to the senses of 'is'; now 'that which is' in one sense denotes
a 'this', in another a quantity, in another a quality. And so there
can be a formula or definition even of white man, but not in the sense
in which there is a definition either of white or of a substance.
Part 5 "
"It is a difficult question, if one denies that a formula with an
added determinant is a definition, whether any of the terms that are
not simple but coupled will be definable. For we must explain them
by adding a determinant. E.g. there is the nose, and concavity, and
snubness, which is compounded out of the two by the presence of the
one in the other, and it is not by accident that the nose has the
attribute either of concavity or of snubness, but in virtue of its
nature; nor do they attach to it as whiteness does to Callias, or
to man (because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as
'male' attaches to animal and 'equal' to quantity, and as all so-called
'attributes propter se' attach to their subjects. And such attributes
are those in which is involved either the formula or the name of the
subject of the particular attribute, and which cannot be explained
without this; e.g. white can be explained apart from man, but not
female apart from animal. Therefore there is either no essence and
definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in another
sense, as we have said.
"But there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose
and concave nose are the same thing, snub and concave will be the
thing; but if snub and concave are not the same (because it is impossible
to speak of snubness apart from the thing of which it is an attribute
propter se, for snubness is concavity-in-a-nose), either it is impossible
to say 'snub nose' or the same thing will have been said twice, concave-nose
nose; for snub nose will be concave-nose nose. And so it is absurd
that such things should have an essence; if they have, there will
be an infinite regress; for in snub-nose nose yet another 'nose' will
be involved.
"Clearly, then, only substance is definable. For if the other categories
also are definable, it must be by addition of a determinant, e.g.
the qualitative is defined thus, and so is the odd, for it cannot
be defined apart from number; nor can female be defined apart from
animal. (When I say 'by addition' I mean the expressions in which
it turns out that we are saying the same thing twice, as in these
instances.) And if this is true, coupled terms also, like 'odd number',
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METAPHYSICS 80
will not be definable (but this escapes our notice because our formulae
are not accurate.). But if these also are definable, either it is
in some other way or, as we definition and essence must be said to
have more than one sense. Therefore in one sense nothing will have
a definition and nothing will have an essence, except substances,
but in another sense other things will have them. Clearly, then, definition
is the formula of the essence, and essence belongs to substances either
alone or chiefly and primarily and in the unqualified sense.
Part 6 "
"We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or
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